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EXCEPTION OR MODEL? SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA, SOCIAL POLICY AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT DURING THE COLD WAR¹

Abstract

Socialist Yugoslavia's deep engagement with the Global South, primarily through the Non-Aligned Movement, represents an important corrective to the obsession with bipolarity between the West and the East that dominates orthodox histories of the Cold War. Even before the Belgrade summit of September 1961, Yugoslavia represented a "Third Way" in at least two senses. Firstly, at least from the time of the break with Stalin (known within Yugoslavia as the "historic no") in 1948, Yugoslavia refused to be a member of either of the Cold War blocs. Secondly, by forming alliances with countries emerging from colonialism in the Global South, partic-

ularly in Asia and Africa, it solidified this Third Way as a transnational project and ensured that the focus of international relations was, at least as much, on North-South inequalities as on East-West conflicts.

No less important was the development of a rather unusual social policy model or welfare assemblage, differing in important respects not only from Western welfare states, including the Scandinavian welfare states, but also from those welfare arrangements dominant within Soviet-type communism. In this text, based on archival materials and a review of relevant literatures, the focus is on modes of exchange regard-

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ing socio-economic development, including social policy and social work, between socialist Yugoslavia and the Global South, particularly those parts of the Global South playing an active role within the Non-Aligned Movement. A brief overview of the key elements of the Yugoslav social model is followed by a similarly cursory treatment of the reasons behind, and nature of, socialist Yugoslavia's commitment to non-alignment. There then follow three intrinsically interlinked but analytically separable case studies, forming the core empirical base of the text, exploring elements of the circulation of practices, discourses, and people, in relation to social development, between socialist Yugoslavia and parts of the Global South. Questions for further research are then noted by way of conclusion.

Keywords: Non-alignment, Socialist Yugoslavia, Social Policy, Global South, Social Development, The New International Economic Order

INTRODUCTION

Socialist Yugoslavia's deep engagement with the Global South, primarily through the Non-Aligned Movement, represents an important corrective to the obsession with bipolarity between the West and the East that dominates orthodox histories of the Cold War. This bipolarity serves to reify the West and the East as if they were homogeneous and to ignore, marginalize, or fold into the East-West conflict, the whole of the South. Even before the Belgrade summit of September 1961, Yugoslavia

represented a "Third Way" in at least two senses. Firstly, from the time of the break with Stalin (known within Yugoslavia as the "historic no") in 1948, Yugoslavia refused to be a member of either of the Cold War blocs. Secondly, by forming alliances with countries emerging from colonialism in the Third World, known contemporarily as the Global South, particularly in Asia and Africa, it solidified this Third Way as a transnational project and ensured that the focus of international relations was, at least as much, on North-South inequalities as on East-West conflicts. The concept of the Global South remains "fuzzy", of course, not least as, albeit after the period being discussed here, the East of the North began „its staggering descent into a new poverty zone“ and the East of the South „was in a process of catch-up industrialisation“ (Veit, forthcoming). For our purposes here, no less important was the development of a rather unusual social policy model or welfare assemblage, differing in important respects not only from Western welfare states, but also from those welfare arrangements dominant within Soviet-type communism.

In this text the focus is on modes of exchange regarding socio-economic development, including social policy and social work, between socialist Yugoslavia and the Global South, particularly those parts of the Global South playing an active role within the Non-Aligned Movement. A brief overview of the key elements of the Yugoslav social model is followed by a similarly cursory treat-

ment of the reasons behind, and nature of, socialist Yugoslavia's commitment to non-alignment. There then follow three intrinsically interlinked but analytically separable cases, forming the core empirical base of the text, exploring elements of exchange in terms of the circulation of practices, discourses, and people, in relation to social development, between socialist Yugoslavia and parts of the Global South. Questions for further research are then noted by way of conclusion.

The text challenges both the Eurocentrism and „methodological nationalism“ of much of what still passes for mainstream social policy research to this day. Eurocentrism here is taken to mean the construction of „spatio-temporal hierarchies that take Europe as an isolated space and situate it ... as being ahead of everyone and everywhere else“ (Çapan, 2018). „Methodological nationalism“ is “the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2022; 302). In tracing historical trajectories of transnational, international and global exchange in social policy, there is a need to address much more extensively the role of imperialism and colonialism in shaping social policies, both in the former colonies and in the colonial centres, as well as addressing the diverse paths of decolonial struggle including, but not limited to, varieties of post-colonial state-building. An anti-colonial

turn² in the study of social policy would require nothing less than a new lexicon, a radically different conceptual architecture, in which Westphalian contemporary welfare states are not seen as the primary source of social policy frameworks and discourses. In short, much of mainstream social policy overstates the spatio-temporal significance of “modern” welfare states in Cold War Western Europe as well as viewing their Eastern European “premature” counterparts within the same conceptual frame. It, of course, seriously underestimates the importance of the colonial dimension of social policy both in the colonies and “at home” (Midgeley and Piachaud, 2011). The Global South if it is discussed at all, is framed exclusively through a Eurocentric conceptual lens.

THE SOCIALIST YUGOSLAV SOCIAL MODEL

In a 1975 report, the World Bank (1975) described Yugoslavia's welfare system as both ‘highly developed’ and ‘decentralized’. The World Bank was no doubt impressed by the way the country had embraced so-called ‘market socialism’, following the ‘break with Stalin’ in 1948 and the explicit attempt to develop an economic and social system radically different from the Soviet bloc, which was also crucial, as we note below, in terms of the formation of the

² I use the term „decolonial“ in this text to indicate the moment of coming to statehood of colonised countries, whereas the term anti-colonial is used for broad theories seeking to understand these processes.

Non-Aligned Movement. The experiment with ‘self-management’, “the right and/or responsibility of all to participate in the management of everything that is of concern to them in the production and the reproduction of the means of existence” (Samary, 2019; 69), the brainchild of the Yugoslav politician and theoretician Edvard Kardelj, began in the early 1950s in terms of workplace democracy but was extended, later, to society in general and to local communities (Samary, 2019; Bing, 2019). To an extent, “self-management”, of interest to some of the emerging Scandinavian welfare states and to sections of the left in France, Italy and elsewhere, was stronger in rhetoric than reality. Nevertheless, the early phase of socialist Yugoslavia, described as “the twenty glorious years” (Suvin, 2016) translated, from the mid-1950s onwards, into improved living standards for most, if not all, of the population.

Whilst not concurring with the obsession with “legacy effects” beloved of historical institutionalists, not least because of the formalistic insistence on “path dependency” and the way in which assumptions to be tested empirically are treated as unshakable foundational arguments, it is important to bear in mind that some aspects of the Yugoslav socialist welfare state actually predate Yugoslav socialism. Those parts of what became Yugoslavia that were located within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy developed aspects of a Bismarckian-type social insurance system, applied to health, pensions and unemployment benefits for

some, as early as the end of the nineteenth century. Yugoslavia after the Second World War developed a largely Bismarckian legal framework for social welfare, whilst consolidating welfare for the vast majority, if not all, as a vital component of socialist modernization. This encompassed mass literacy campaigns, free basic health care and broad provision of housing. A legacy of public health innovation and reform, free education and a basic social safety net, was extended, therefore, in the context of rapid industrialization and urbanization, with associated improvements in essential infrastructure. However, it was always a dual welfare system, with the majority of rights reserved for the newly emerging industrial proletariat, alongside administrators, civil servants and army officers, war veterans, and party functionaries, and not for the rural population. For example, the relatively generous child benefits that were introduced in the late 1940s were only available to employees in the state sector. Health insurance, allowing for health care beyond basic levels, was not extended to the self-employed and those working on their own farms until 1980 (Stubbs, 2018) and agricultural pensions, if they existed, were much lower than industrial pensions and, often, based on voluntary contributions.

Yugoslav socialism, then, combined aspects of state planning, market mechanisms and self-management that made it unusual, if not wholly exceptional, amongst socialist countries at the time. It entailed a form of direct democracy,

with the balance between the three elements of marketization, planning, and self-management, changing over time (Marković, 2012), as “market socialism” took different forms in different conjunctures (Unkovski-Korica, 2016), sometimes more socialist but, increasingly over time, more market-oriented. Self-managed enterprises formed the initial core site of decentralized welfare not unlike in much of the rest of Eastern Europe, offering housing, healthcare, childcare and often subsidized vacations for industrial and administrative workers and their families. Enterprises had a degree of control over micro-economic decision making, although macro-level priorities were set at the federal and republic levels. Enterprise planning tended to combine social, economic and political criteria, and new industrial complexes were often situated in relatively impoverished parts of the country in order to spread prosperity and growth more widely.

Industrialization and labour migration went hand in hand with migration chains consisting of rural-urban migration, migration from the poorer Southern republics to the richer Northern ones, and out-migration from Yugoslavia itself. Significant numbers of the working age population became “guest workers” in parts of Western Europe, acting as a safety valve when unemployment rose. In the process of rapid industrialization, many single industry towns and cities were created, which later became extremely vulnerable to de-industrialization in the crisis years of the 1980s and,

later of course, in the wars. In parallel to the rising power of constituent republics, particularly after the new Constitution of 1974, reflected in relative autonomy to set tax and benefit levels, local municipalities were in charge of a range of welfare issues, including the financing of childcare, education, and the social care of different groups, including older people, people with disabilities, and those at risk of poverty. As the system became ever more cumbersome, so-called “self-managed communities of interest” (“*samoupravne interesne zajednice*” or *SIZovi*) were introduced. These were intermediary organizations, not always directly under communist party control, tasked with connecting service users, service providers (in health care, education, the employment service, housing and social protection, for example) and ordinary citizens, in effect seeking to extend direct democracy beyond the workplace. These were, sometimes, an important source of innovation in social policy and helped to establish feedback loops between local administrations, workers in the social welfare system, and service users.

It is important to remember that the rapid industrialization of socialist Yugoslavia was only partially translated into urbanization; many of those who moved from agrarian to industrial work continued to live in non-urban settings. At the same time, many of the newly industrialized workers continued to have links with subsistence agriculture, leaving work mid-afternoon to return home to work the land. Small towns grew

alongside the capital cities, many with populations of less than 10,000 people. Later they experienced a significant influx; by 1971, less than 40 per cent of all inhabitants had been born in the city in which they lived (Rusinow, 1972). As noted above, many social rights were restricted to the urban population, especially those employed by the state. This continued to characterize the process of modernization throughout the 1970s and 1980s, along with the construction of an 'urban habitus', with peasant culture and beliefs often seen as inhibiting modernization (Bilić and Stubbs, 2015), but also as a source of stability and cohesion.

The vexed question of regional inequalities within Yugoslavia proved intractable, notwithstanding decades of explicitly redistributive policies with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo, never reaching more than 75% of overall Yugoslav GDP. By 1989, Kosovo's GDP was only 26% of the Yugoslav average, having fallen from 39% in 1959 (Vojnić, 1995). The reasons for this appear to be linked to economic factors as well as the contradictory pressures from federal and republic scales of governance. Market reforms of the 1960s meant that the Yugoslav economy was exposed to external shocks, such as the oil crisis of the early 1970s, relevant, also, in terms of the Non-Aligned Movement more generally. Consequently, a policy of 'export-led growth' became increasingly difficult to implement. Following the 1974 constitution, which gave much more power

to republics, the crisis moved from being primarily economic, to having an increasing social and political dimension with tensions, often ethnicised in nature, erupting periodically between the wealthier and the poorer republics. Conflicts between the constituent Republics became ever more intense, with a continuing, ever-widening, gap between the richest and the poorest parts of the Yugoslav Socialist Federation, such that the ideology of "brotherhood and unity", or equality between different population groups, became less and less meaningful in practice.

Unlike countries within the Soviet bloc, in Yugoslavia from the early 1950s, there was a recognition that social problems would not simply 'with-er away' under a redistributive welfare state as classic Marxist-Leninism had suggested. Social problems needed trained social workers to solve them, it was argued. Training of social workers began in high schools through a two-year program and, later, four-year programs were established at universities across the country. This led to the establishment in every municipality, in the early 1960s, of multi-disciplinary Centres for Social Work (CSWs) (Stubbs and Maglajlić, 2012). This innovation sought to make personal social services accessible and available to all, not just the newly industrialized urban proletariat – although one of the main reasons for establishing CSWs was the growing social problems in the rapidly expanding urban areas (Maglajlić and Stubbs, 2018), particularly urban youth experi-

encing problems during the transition from school to work. Although there was social work, in some form, in parts of the Soviet bloc, it was only in Yugoslavia, amongst socialist countries, I would assert, that it became a statutory service for all citizens in this way.

The institutionalization of professional social work co-existed with localized planning and emergent participatory mechanisms. However, the Yugoslav welfare state was 'productivist' to its core, not unlike most of the Global North in this respect. Populations outside of industrial production relations, including the un- and under-employed, those labelled deviants by the authorities, especially young people in conflict with the law, and the homeless, were seen as needing correction and discipline, and this was one of the main tasks of the CSWs. As inequalities grew, a new underclass emerged, consisting of those unable to secure minimum levels of subsistence (Archer, Duda and Stubbs, 2016). These included the unemployed and underemployed from the late 1960s encouraged to seek work abroad as guest workers (Le Normand, 2016), Roma (Sardelić, 2016), and disaffected youth.

Yugoslavia was gripped by a severe economic crisis throughout the 1980s and became subject to stringent Structural Adjustment Programs by the IMF. The resultant cutbacks in many areas of welfare, a kind of austerity leading to reductions in services and, through inflation, an erosion of benefits, led to the return of urban poverty for the first time

since the Second World War (Milanović, 1991). This impacted most on those with little or no connection to subsistence agriculture, underpinned by economic arguments that an 'expensive' welfare state could no longer be afforded in times of economic recession. In many ways, the economic, political and social crisis of the 1980s made it virtually impossible to keep Yugoslavia together and was not unimportant as a contributing factor to the wars of the Yugoslav succession in the 1990s, bringing with them much greater human, economic and social costs, of course.

THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

How the Non-Aligned Movement came into being and, perhaps even more importantly, its significance during the Cold War, is a complicated story. Indeed, throughout the time that socialist Yugoslavia was a member, between 1961 and 1991, it held a peculiar positionality given that it was not, itself, situated in the Global South. Between 1945 and 1948, albeit with increasing resistance and concern, socialist Yugoslavia largely followed a path as a loyal satellite of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, following the break with Stalin and failure to secure meaningful co-operation with other Balkan states, Yugoslavia looked towards countries in the Global South emerging from colonial rule for a new alliance, aligned neither with the Soviet Union nor with the capitalist United States.

The Yugoslav communist leadership, having emerged victorious from the Partisan struggle against fascism, and receiving much less support than asked for from the axis powers (Maclean, 1957), held on to an anti-fascist internationalism that had its own decolonial logic and focus. Yugoslav President Tito's radical defence of the principle of 'self-determination' and his critique of an understanding of world revolution based on the "unconditional subordination of small socialist countries to one large socialist country" (Tito, 1963; 20) also resonated with many decolonial states, unwilling to swap colonial rule for the undue influence of one or other power bloc. The break with the Soviet Union had left Yugoslavia isolated and weak both politically and economically, but Tito's tour of Asian and African states between December 1954 and February 1955 cemented the idea of a new global role for Yugoslavia.

In April 1955, of course, the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states took place although, of those attending, only India, Indonesia, Nepal and Burma had an openly stated commitment not to associate with either of the Cold War power blocs (Dinkel, 2019; 43). The fact that, after the conference, attempts to organise a follow-up came to nothing, not least because of a continued border dispute between China and India, no doubt "contributed to the emergence of the non-aligned states" (ibid; 83), including socialist Yugoslavia. The meeting on the island of Brijuni in July 1956 between Nasser, the President of Egypt,

Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, and Tito forged, at least symbolically, socialist Yugoslavia's central position in demands for a new international order based on "equality, ... disarmament, (and) international economic and financial co-operation ... in accordance with the basic principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations"³.

The fifteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) in New York that commenced on 20 September 1960 saw extensive, and concerted, lobbying by a group of countries termed, variously, as 'neutral', 'non-engaged' and 'non-bloc', formulating a resolution to reduce Cold War tensions, and calling for a summit between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. On 29 September 1960, a meeting at the Yugoslav mission in New York attended by Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, Indonesian President Sukarno, Nasser, Nehru and Tito was the place where a non-aligned and anti-bloc politics gained shape (Willetts, 2023). In his speech to the UNGA, Tito argued that "the process of the national, economic, political and cultural emancipation of former colonies is a historical necessity" and warned of the danger that the struggle against colonialism might become "entangled with East-West antagonisms" (Tito, 1963).

³ Brijuni Communiqué, 19 July 1956, <https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-1231449918/view?sectionId=nla.obj-1260505871&partId=nla.obj-1231591879#page/n57/mode/lup> (accessed 20 June 2022).

What began as a loose exchange of ideas with Nehru, in particular, resisting calls for a more formal structure, or even further summits, gained momentum not least because some radical challenges to NAM did not really materialise. Indonesian President Sukarno was overthrown in a military coup before his idea of a Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) could take place. CONEFO's radical vision of political sovereignty, economic self-reliance and cultural self-assertion (Khuduri, 2018) was, however, taken forward by Cuba's President Fidel Castro through The Tricontinental Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, held in Havana from 3-15 January 1966. Side-lining Yugoslavia, the conference advocated for armed struggle rather than non-violence, and connected revolutionary consciousness in the Global South with rising Black Power movements in the United States (Young, 2018). Its main direct influence, however, was more in terms of radical cultural production. As alternatives faded away, and reform of the United Nations brought only limited results, NAM emerged revitalised in the 1970s, becoming somewhat more formalised in terms of co-ordination for the Lusaka, Zambia, summit in September 1970, attended by 53 Member states and 13 observers, including those from liberation movements, compared to the 25 states and 3 observers from Belgrade nine years earlier.

The contradictions of socialist Yugoslavia's role in NAM can be captured by the term "liminal hegemony" (Stubbs, 2019) reflecting its ambivalent positionality within geopolitical circuits of decolonial affinity both offering leadership of and direction to the movement whilst being aware of the problems of being the one always "providing advice and coming up with ideas"⁴ and, indeed, drafting conference communiques in advance. Ultimately, Cuba's involvement in NAM, because of its closeness, at times, to the Soviet Union, limited the willingness of Latin American, though not so much Caribbean, countries to participate (Cosovschi, 2023). At the same time, Tito sought to minimize Cuban influence through a mixture of persuasion, exclusion from certain discussions, and mobilizing of allies (Jakovina, 2011; 396). Even at the Non-Aligned summit in Havana from 3-9 September 1979, many resolutions were watered down from the radicalism of their original iterations (Willets, 1981; 13). Tito's 'mild' and 'statesmanlike' speech (Jakovina, 2011; 399) was, of course, his last at such a summit before his death on 4 May 1980. What is, also, clear is that Yugoslavia's distrust of some radical alternatives to the Non-Aligned Movement included a failure to engage with racism other than in terms of its most dramatic manifestations in apartheid Southern Africa. An ambiguous

⁴ Arhiv Jugoslavije, KPR-I-4-a/11, Notes from SFRJ Co-ordinating Cttee for the Preparation of the Fourth Non-Aligned Summit, 4 January 1973.

understanding of global class relations, including an explicit attempt to leave ideological questions off the agenda, then, went alongside a failure to address fully racialised and gendered structures of oppression (Baker, 2018; Bonfiglioli, 2023). Again, although this deserves much greater attention, the connections between Yugoslavia's internal politics and its external relations through NAM, are noteworthy.

Crucially, although conceived as a multi-state "top down" initiative, NAM created the possibility for a relatively autonomous "non-alignment from below" in terms of student exchanges and exchanges in the realms of science, art and culture, architecture and industry. A more complete history of NAM would explore diverse actors and institutions ranging from the fully formal and official to those that were completely informal. In the realms of cultural exchange, and beyond, the role of intermediary and professional associations remains crucial (Kolešnik, 2023). Again, Yugoslavia's 'liminal hegemony' is illustrated by the directionality of exchange – consider the fact that it was mostly students from the Global South attending universities in Yugoslavia (Dugonjic-Rodwin and Mladenović, 2023) whereas Yugoslav companies tended to win architectural and construction contracts in the Global South and rarely the other way around.

Socialist Yugoslavia's motivations for its role within NAM were always a mixture of idealism and solidarity, on the one hand, and instrumentalism and

opportunism on the other. As we discuss below, the "turn to the economic" that marked NAM discussions in the 1970s was an important moment in articulating a Third Way that did have important ripple effects within the Global South. Yugoslavia certainly used NAM to penetrate new markets. Its arms sales increased, both to liberation movements and to regimes such as Indonesia even after a right-wing dictatorship under Suharto came to power. It also pursued, at first in secret, the development of an atomic bomb, despite the rhetoric of support for disarmament. In the crisis years of the 1980s, Yugoslavia, in the context of the Helsinki process, became more oriented to the European stage in the context of superpower détente although this combined with an insistence that Europe come to terms with colonialism and implied learning lessons from NAM for the European space. At the same time, as Unkovski-Korica (2016; 220) has argued, the post-1974 hollowing out of federal institutions saw the East-West conflict re-imposed within socialist Yugoslavia itself. The global North-South divide was, also, mirrored within Yugoslavia and, indeed, took on many of the characteristics, in late socialist Yugoslavia at least, of 'neo-colonialism' or 'internal colonialism', reproducing a kind of developmentalised, culturalised and, even, racialised, hierarchy that can also be found within NAM itself (Rexhepi, 2019). The term 'internal colonialism', of course, has its own complicated conceptual history, from Lenin on the Soviet Union, via Gram-

sci on Italy to Wolpe on South Africa, and beyond (Hind, 1984). The concept is used by a number of Kosovan Albanian scholars and activists to refer to the economic extractivism and political repression of the Yugoslav centre towards the periphery⁵. Crucially, however, as we show in the next sections, NAM was an important space for socio-economic exchange and for a different kind of social and development policy than found in either the West or the East during the Cold War.

CASE I: DECOLONIAL STATE BUILDING AND PARTICIPATORY SOCIAL POLICY

The importance of the decolonial moment, both as a modernizing project, and in terms of models of social and economic policy based on “norms of solidarity” (Adesina, 2022; 32), does, to an extent, tie developments in the Global South with the path of socialist Yugoslavia. Social welfare was, in much of the Global South, an extension of the decolonial state building project which, whilst never completely freed from the legacies of the colonial past, succeeded in charting “alternative paths to national reconstruction” and enacting “sovereign national projects” (ibid; 38) in spaces of relative autonomy. Although the emphasis might differ from country to coun-

try, modernization combined industrialization and technologically-driven agricultural development, with economic growth, creating the conditions for investment in social infrastructure and rapid improvements in literacy, education, and health for the entire population, precisely as Yugoslavia had done after independence. Although not emphasised as much, full employment, gender equality and women’s emancipation, as well as some kind of social protection for those outside of the formal labour market, were also important components of a broad decolonial social contract. Labour freed from all forms of unfreedom, ranging from slavery to more subtle forms of labour obligation, coercion and exploitation, also constituted a common demand across the emerging decolonial world. Escaping from the misery and violence of the colonial project also, of course, built on an expansion of social protection begun by some colonial authorities in the later stages of colonial rule, although both the scale and nature of the commitment to social welfare was significantly better. In short, “educational enrolments grew, access to health care improved, nutritional conditions were enhanced, and life expectancy increased” (Midgely, 1998; 42). Expanding welfare beyond the social privileges of the white colonial/settler class was, at times, more rhetoric than reality, with “empty shell” institutions lacking resources and trained staff⁶.

⁵ „Performing YU and EU in Kosovo: an interview with Vjosa Musliu“, *Remembering Yugoslavia* podcast, <https://rememberingyugoslavia.com/podcast-yu-eu-kosovo/> (accessed 30 September 2022).

⁶ I am grateful to Jeremy Gould for this point.

One of the most important aspects of a more holistic understanding of social welfare, as a path to political and economic emancipation, was, I suggest, a commitment to participatory processes of one kind or another. This can be illustrated by a report for UNESCO authored in 1979 by a leading Yugoslav sociologist Rudi Supek, explicitly linking socialist Yugoslavia with the developing world (Supek, 1976). The text oscillates between the conceptual and the technical without addressing empirical case studies but, clearly, could not have been written without immersion in the practical possibilities and pitfalls of participation. Of particular resonance is Supek's understanding of participatory social planning as "revolutionary reformism" (ibid; 5), as a way of harnessing and institutionalizing the grassroots energy of the liberation struggle as "a cornerstone of socialist democracy" (ibid; 2) extending from factories to broader community life. "Self-management", not only of the Yugoslav type but, also, derived from Latin American experiences, is clearly central to the argument, although Supek refers to broader philosophical and political underpinnings including "anarchist, left-wing communist and libertarian socialist movements, or even such religious movements as the Quakers or the Gandhi movement" (ibid; 12). Meaningful community participation, then, is crucial to a kind of institutionalised anti-institutionalism, he argues, guarding against the dangers of bureaucratisation and new forms of hierarchy including "authoritarian man-

agerial cliques" (ibid; 15) echoing some of the concerns of the Praxis school⁷, to which he was affiliated and, of course, the critique of the purged dissident Milovan Djilas (Djilas, 1957).

Although he only refers explicitly to social work and social policy in one short section (Supek, 1976; 49), Supek is aware of the problems that rapid industrialization and modernization of agricultural production can cause in terms of a loss of what he terms "traditional social cohesion" (ibid; 50). Drawing upon the Yugoslav experience, he points out that "the rural population participates far more than the urban population in all activities of the socio-political organs" (ibid), attributing this to remoteness from external influence and "greater natural cohesion" (ibid; 51). Urbanization processes tend to undermine participatory democracy, he argues, and advocates for a preservation of "community spirit" in the interests of social cohesion. Whether by accident or design, this discussion parallels debates in the African context where Nyerere in Tanzania and Nkrumah in Ghana sought to underpin their socialist ideals in traditions of mutuality, generosity and collective ownership found, or supposedly found, in the African village (Adesina, 2022; 37), with impacts on their understandings of the nature of industrialization processes and the balance between urban and rural development.

⁷ A detailed bibliography of important works on Praxis in English can be found at http://www.autodidactproject.org/bib/praxis2_guide.html (accessed 29 September 2022).

In general terms, Yugoslavia did hold onto a kind of mentoring role, at times rather a paternalistic one it should be said, within the developing world, with Supek's designation of Yugoslavia as "one of the more developed less developed countries" (Supek, 1976; 51) a neat discursive juggling act that reinforces this. Social infrastructure, social investment and, indeed, the idea of "social product" all reinforced this with Kardelj, the leading architect of self-management socialism, extending the labour theory of value to encompass current and past embodied labour (Stubbs, 2018). Tracing direct lineages from this model to other Non-Aligned countries would require, however, more in-depth archival research.

CASE II: THE LONG MARCH THROUGH GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS

Whether attributable to Gramsci or Rudi Dutschke, the idea of "the long march through the institutions", securing discursive and practical toeholds in institutional structures, was an integral strategic goal of socialist Yugoslavia, and the wider Non-Aligned Movement, in transnational, regional and global terms. As we discuss in terms of the New International Economic Order below, the more institutions pushing a similar agenda the better, seemed to be the tactics in play, establishing a kind of epistemic community around global social policy (Deacon with Hulse and Stubbs, 1997). Of course, the United Nations and her agencies were crucial

in this respect with parts of an emerging Yugoslav expertised transnational class not only holding important positions but, crucially, using those positions to advance ideas of non-alignment in terms of social, economic, cultural and other policies.

Arno Trulzsch has written extensively on the role of Yugoslav legal experts in framing a large body of UN human rights law including conventions on the elimination of racial discrimination, peace keeping and disarmament, and contemporary humanitarian law (Trulzsch, 2022). His argument that socialist Yugoslav experts were in a unique position to enable a codification of global legal principles on, for example, the rights and duties of states in the international system, proposing solutions that overcame the ideologically-driven conflict between liberal-capitalist and Marxist-socialist camps, is well made. The story is by no means confined to the UN, however.

In recent work, Čarna Brković has traced how, in the 1970s, the Red Cross of Yugoslavia intervened explicitly to shift the orientation of the International Federation of the Red Cross towards a much more politicized understanding of humanitarianism under conflict conditions, linked to decolonial liberation and the establishment of just peace (Brković, forthcoming). The first Red Cross Peace Conference, held in Belgrade in June 1975, forged what she terms "new networks of moral sentiments" whilst also advocating for improved representation of the Global South, and nation-

al liberation movements, in Red Cross structures. The broader “modernist developmental project” of which this was a part was, of course, not without its contradictions: people from Africa and Asia were invited to Belgrade to learn how to establish their own humanitarian organizations whilst, upon entry, being medically examined for tropical diseases. The conference itself was a venue for the promotion of Non-Aligned Movement ideas on peace, encompassing active peaceful co-existence, self-determination and social justice. Socialist Yugoslavia, of course, also offered practical support to national liberation struggles, including arms sales and military training but, also, medical care, blood donations, and so on, in contradiction, of course, to its more general stance of promoting ‘de-ideologization’ and avoiding radicalism. Yugoslavia, along with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, for example, developed a system whereby the Algerian FLN could send its wounded soldiers to treatment facilities in the country (Onyedum, 2012; 718).

Chiara Bonfiglioli has written extensively on the contribution of Yugoslav socialist women to women’s internationalism and gendered understandings of development, both within and outside the United Nations. A key figure she discusses is Vida Tomšič, a Partisan activist who became Minister of Social Policy in Slovenia in 1945, at the age of 31. A professor of family law, Tomšič chaired the Commission for Social Development of the UN Economic

and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1963 and played a pivotal role in UN World Conferences on Women during the UN Decade for Women from 1975-1985 (Bonfiglioli, 2021). Tomšič’s strong links with activists, politicians and policy makers in India and Sri Lanka led to her being a trusted advisor on a range of themes, including social policy and gender equality. Crucially, her role within the International Planned Parenthood Federation, alongside another Yugoslav feminist scholar-activist from a younger generation Nevenka Petrić, illustrates the long march perfectly. In ways reminiscent of the Red Cross story above, against the neo-Malthusianism of Western actors, Tomšič and Petrić contested the idea that the Global South was doomed to under-development as a result of high and increasing birth rates (Bonfiglioli, 2022). Of course, the stances that Tomšič and Petrić articulated were not as radical as many of the critics of developmentalism, and its offshoot “women and development”, in the Global South were expounding (Sen and Grown, 1987). Indeed, the two women were largely silent regarding what could be seen as similar concerns regarding the birth rate of those of Albanian origin within Yugoslavia itself. Understanding Tomšič as a transnational networker, empowering other women activists in the Global South, and as a gatekeeper, granting access to other Yugoslav activists to key international positions, seems to be a fruitful way in to a more nuanced understanding of the impact of socialist

Yugoslavia on social policy in the Global South and beyond.

CASE III: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

After a focus on a political “third way” during the 1960s, a second phase of non-alignment began with the Lusaka, Zambia summit of 1970, hosted by Kenneth Kaunda, significant for injecting new life, momentum and, indeed, formal structure to what had been, until then, a rather fitful and piecemeal existence of NAM. Although it is important not to overstate the case, since such themes had been discussed earlier, the Lusaka summit saw a turn to economic themes and, in particular, a framing that, after colonial political domination had been defeated across much, although by no means all, of the world, the next challenge was to confront “neo-colonial” economic domination and the need for “material decolonisation” (Veit, forthcoming). The Statement on Economic Progress from the 1970 summit stated that “the persistence of an inequitable world economic system inherited from the colonial past and continued through present neo colonialism poses insurmountable difficulties in breaking the bondage of poverty and shackles of economic dependence” (Non-Aligned Movement, 1970).

Much of the framing during the summit was of the “enough words, we need action” type and this is reflected through a closing statement from the summit urging “the UN to employ international

machinery to bring about a rapid transformation of the world economic system, particularly in the field of trade, finance and technology, so that economic domination yields to economic co-operation and economic strength is used for the benefit of the world community” (ibid). It can be argued that the role of NAM in pushing this agenda derived from another strategic choice in terms of a view that the more different but interlinked agencies broadly in agreement the better. In terms of what became The New International Economic Order (NIEO), NAM lined up alongside the group of developing countries G-77 and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), both established in 1964, with a growing feeling that UNCTAD had not lived up to the high expectations placed in it by the Global South and Yugoslavia a decade earlier. The intellectual underpinnings of what became the NIEO are interesting and eclectic, borrowing a great deal from the dependency theory of Raul Prebisch, Hans Singer, and others, with Marxists such as Samir Amin and world systems theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein as, more or less, supportive critics (Addo, 1984). Stated succinctly, severe worsening of the “terms of trade” against producers of primary commodities made it impossible to fund even basic welfare, let alone development. The NAM summit in Algiers in 1973 was crucial and, indeed, it produced a form of words that, as Jankowitsch and Sauviant (1978) showed, were then largely re-used in UN Resolution 3202 passed

at the General Assembly Special Session on 1 May 1974⁸.

As the UN system and, in particular UNESCO, was tasked with rolling out the NIEO, both intellectually and practically, a common thread was the need to go “beyond economics”, such that themes that appear very contemporary arose including: issues of planetary boundaries mostly, but not always, responding to arguments from *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al, 1972) with concern that the North would block the path to industrialization for the Global South; migration and brain drain; and cultural politics. The social dimension of the NIEO is often more implicit than explicit. However, a clear shift in both the focus and framing of what we would now term “global social policy” can be discerned, broadly from “hunger” via “poverty” to “inequality”, and from a kind of “moral underclass discourse” (Levitas, 1999) to a structural understanding. It can also be seen as enabling the social component of “developmentalism” to be much more in focus alongside greater attention to global social rights (Mollaer, 2016).

Ultimately, the fate of the NIEO was determined by, at least, three factors. Firstly, it fell victim to a shift in global social governance towards the International Financial Institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF. Indeed, this ushered in the moment of neo-liberal structural adjustment and the dom-

inance of institutions reflecting US hegemony in the political regulation of the world economic system. Secondly, the oil price rises of the early and late 1970s created a set of new global dynamics that undermined the solidarity of the Global South with oil becoming a commodity unlike other commodities, and a new divide between oil producers and oil consumers becoming apparent, including inside the Non-Aligned Movement itself. Attempts to create a Non-Aligned Bank, to establish a fund for the least developed countries, and to stabilize commodity prices all came to nothing or, as in the last case, was far too little far too late. Thirdly, from the outset, the contradictions of the NIEO were such that different actors could find in it whatever they wanted ranging from a revolutionary anti-capitalism to a reformist “capitalism with a human face”, and even exhortations to “collective self-reliance” could be interpreted in many different ways.

Ron and Prashad (2021) have recently suggested that the NIEO could, even now, form the basis for struggles for social, economic and planetary justice, since it based its arguments on “equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest, and cooperation among all states ... which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between developed and developing countries, and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations“ (ibid).

⁸ <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/218451?ln=en> (accessed 29 September 2022).

For Getachew (2019), the NIEO formed the apex of anticolonial worldmaking and represented an attempt to channel the UN as the means for the creation of “an egalitarian global economy” (ibid; 100). At the same time, it can be seen to have combined a Marxist “diagnosis of economic dependence” with prescriptions “articulated within the terms of a liberal political economy” (ibid; 145). Whatever the reality, researching the social aspects of the NIEO in much greater depth would help to rectify the profound “historical presentism” of much of what passes for the study of “global social policy” (Lendvai-Bainton and Stubbs, 2022).

CONCLUSIONS

Although only a very tentative step towards a different kind of analysis of social policy during the Cold War, the text concentrates attention on what, elsewhere, we have termed “policy translation”, an understanding of policy-politics as “always in the making” and “revised, inflected, appropriated and bent in encounters of different kinds” (Clarke et al, 2015; 15) – in short, performed not preformed. This “politically infused process of dislocation and displacement” (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007; 15) is never technical nor neutral and rendering it as such would be to miss the point. Directionalities and flows matter and the extent to which these remain unilinear or become much more multi-directional, is a matter for open empirical research which retains “the capacity to surprise” (Willis and

Trondman, 2000). Crucially, this text has suggested that the Yugoslav developmentalist welfare model, along with self-management and “brotherhood and unity”, were of immense importance in solidifying the Yugoslav state at home, much as non-alignment was important in relations in the world. However, although all of these had a relevance for NAM countries in the Global South, more work is needed to explore the extent to which these practices both influenced, and were influenced by, developments elsewhere.

A second challenge to the orthodox literature is in terms of a focus on modes of thought that originate in the Global South including Pan-Africanism, Negritude, liberation theology and many others. The Eurocentrism of all forms of social policy analysis, including Marxist orthodoxies, needs to be countered through studies that provincialize or de-centre Europe (Chakrabarty, 2000) but do not ignore it completely in terms of the circulation of ideas and practices. Combining these two elements would undermine a comparative social policy tradition and allow for a much more open focus on the exchange and flows of actors, structures, institutions and discourses (Deacon and Stubbs, 2013).

The study of counter-hegemonic worldmaking (Getachew, 2019) and the articulation of a global social policy “otherwise”, in allowing for the flourishing of “alternate ways of knowing and new forms of knowledge production” (Lendvai-Bainton and Stubbs, 2022), needs to both drills down to the every-

day, and be attentive to the invisible. Crucially, here, the intersections of gender, 'race' and class need to be explored in terms of the translation of decolonial transnational ideals into routine practices in order for social policy, and forms of social and community work not rooted in Northern and Western traditions, to be remembered and recovered. This text has barely scratched the surface, with cases focused as much, if not more,

on discursive exchanges rather than specific practices. Whilst more research is needed, the interim conclusion must be that exchanges between socialist Yugoslavia and the Global South within and around NAM, at least on social policy and social development, were not as deep, not as multi-linear, and not as self-reflexive, as they could have been.

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